The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard of Care by Buck, Isaac D.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-31-2017
The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of
Expense into the Standard of Care
Isaac D. Buck
University of Tennessee College of Law, zbuck@tennessee.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and
Policy Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard of Care, 58
B.C.L. Rev. 101 (), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol58/iss1/4
  101 
THE COST OF HIGH PRICES: EMBEDDING 
AN ETHIC OF EXPENSE INTO THE 
STANDARD OF CARE 
ISAAC D. BUCK 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 103 
I. THE COST OF HEALTH .............................................................................................................. 109 
A. High Prices ............................................................................................................................. 112 
B. High Utilization ...................................................................................................................... 115 
C. Interplay Between Prices and Utilization ............................................................................... 116 
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ................................................................................ 117 
A. The Uniquely Precarious Position of Medicare ...................................................................... 122 
B. Medicare Part B’s History with Drug Pricing ........................................................................ 124 
C. The Relationship Between ASP and Utilization ...................................................................... 129 
D. The Abandoned 2016 CMS Proposal ...................................................................................... 130 
III. FINANCIAL TOXICITY ............................................................................................................ 134 
A. As a Phenomenon .................................................................................................................... 135 
B. As a Legal Breakthrough ........................................................................................................ 140 
C. Finally Linking Cost, Quality, and Harm ................................................................................ 142 
IV. CRUMBLING ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM ................................................................................. 145 
A. Financial Toxicity and New Governance ................................................................................ 147 
B. Role for Physicians ................................................................................................................. 149 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 150 
 
 
  102 
THE COST OF HIGH PRICES: EMBEDDING 
AN ETHIC OF EXPENSE INTO THE 
STANDARD OF CARE 
ISAAC D. BUCK* 
Abstract: In the midst of rapid and radical change of America’s health care sys-
tem, the country’s crown jewel public health insurance program, Medicare, fac-
es an intensifying cost crisis due to a past of uncontrolled prices and a future of 
booming enrollment. A cost challenge garnering particular media attention is 
pharmaceutical drug pricing for Medicare Part B. Historically, congressional ac-
tion has hamstrung Medicare’s ability to limit costs, and as a result, the program 
is increasingly forced to pass on drug costs—through copays and coinsurance—
to its elderly beneficiaries. Public outrage has followed recent stories of phar-
maceutical companies seeking to increase their prices, and policymakers have 
called for increased regulation. Nevertheless, there may be better solutions to 
Medicare’s pharmaceutical drug cost crisis. Recognition of “financial toxici-
ty”—the effect of a pharmaceutical drug’s price on the mortality of the patient 
undergoing treatment—provides a potential new foothold for health care regula-
tion. Like other side effects, if the price of a pharmaceutical drug negatively im-
pacts rates of survival, then the cost of the drug could be an important compo-
nent of clinical decision making and, presumably, the standard of care. Linking 
the cost of a drug to its clinical efficacy could dramatically impact which drugs 
providers choose, giving Medicare a new tool in its efforts to become a better 
gatekeeper of the public fisc without relying on bureaucratic hard power or legal 
enforcement. Using the burgeoning field of new governance, this Article focuses 
on how law and policy could shift to reflect the new understanding of financial 
toxicity. Arguing that the phenomenon finally provides a connection between 
cost and quality, this Article examines the instantiation of cost within the ethic 
of care. This route may provide an opening for a limitation on the ever-
increasing price of pharmaceutical drugs and provide a powerful, yet unarticu-
lated, legal signal that drugs that cost too much negatively impact the quality of 
care that American patients receive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than three years before most Americans had ever heard of Martin 
Shkreli,1 three cancer doctors at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center 
(“Sloan-Kettering”) in New York City did something extraordinary.2 Trum-
peted in a self-authored New York Times opinion piece and further publi-
cized by the television newsmagazine 60 Minutes,3 the three doctors, Dr. 
Peter Bach, Dr. Leonard Saltz, and Dr. Robert Wittes, announced that they 
were declining to include Zaltrap, a new drug approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) to treat colorectal cancer, on Sloan-
Kettering’s hospital formulary list of approved drugs.4 
That they had decided to exclude a drug from the formulary was un-
remarkable, but their reason for doing so was astounding.5 According to the 
doctors, Sloan-Kettering would not prescribe Zaltrap for its cancer patients 
not because it had terrible side effects, nor because it was ineffective, but 
because it was too expensive.6 Remarkably, these preeminent providers at 
one of America’s leading cancer hospitals7 had refused to utilize a newly 
approved FDA drug that reportedly extended survival rates8 because of a 
concern over the threat of “financial toxicity”9 it posed to their patients.10 
Particularly, the doctors noted that Zaltrap’s price was more than twice as 
                                                                                                                 
 1 Martin Shkreli is the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, which was thrust into the national spot-
light during the spring of 2016 after the pharmaceutical company acquired the H.I.V. drug Daraprim 
and raised its price. See Kelefa Sanneh, Everyone Hates Martin Shkreli. Everyone Is Missing the 
Point, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/everyone-
hates-martin-shkreli-everyone-is-missing-the-point [https://perma.cc/X9YX-Q4GV]. 
 2 See Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-a-month-cancer-drug.html
?_r=1& [https://perma.cc/RXH4-8DCK]. 
 3 See Lesley Stahl, The Cost of Cancer Drugs, 60 MINUTES, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-cancer-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/9YXW-J6E3]. 
 4 See Bach et al., supra note 2. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://health.
usnews.com/best-hospitals/area/ny/memorial-sloan-kettering-cancer-center-6213060/cancer [https://
perma.cc/RNN2-E3HG] (noting that Sloan-Kettering is ranked second in the nation for cancer care). 
 8 See Jenny Hope, New Drug for Advanced Bowel Cancer Can Increase Patients’ Lives by Six 
Weeks, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 3, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2287613/
New-drug-advanced-bowel-cancer-increase-patients-lives-weeks.html [https://perma.cc/TS97-99UV]. 
 9 Financial Toxicity is a term that references the impact of costly care, particularly costly 
drugs, on one’s health status or mortality. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Burden of Cancer Isn’t 
Just Cancer, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/
04/08/cancers-sinister-side-effect-financial-toxicity/ [https://perma.cc/SYG7-BT8R]; see also infra 
notes 213–270 and accompanying text. 
 10 See Stahl, supra note 3. 
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much as the clinical alternative drug named Avastin, but Zaltrap offered “no 
advantage over its competitors.”11 
As they did, the doctors encouraged other physicians “to consider the 
financial strains they may cause alongside the benefits they might deliver”12 
when deciding upon treatment regimens. In an exasperated call, they noted 
that “if no one else will act, leading cancer centers and other research hospi-
tals should.”13 In terms more becoming of health policy bureaucrats than 
preeminent cancer doctors who make more money by treating more patients 
with more expensive pharmaceutical drugs,14 they noted that “[t]he future 
of our health care system, and of cancer care, depends on our using our lim-
ited resources wisely.”15 
The decision garnered attention from all corners of the health policy 
world. A later New York Times editorial commended the doctors on their 
stand, calling it “unusually bold.”16 Too long assumed, academics noted that 
the story highlighted the “importance of purchaser willingness to pay as the 
basis of manufacturer price setting among cancer drugs in the U.S. mar-
ket.”17 Other doctors supported the Sloan-Kettering decision.18 Patients de-
cried their lack of consumer power in the marketplace but commended the 
doctors for their advocacy.19 For its part, the Biotechnology Industry Organ-
ization (“BIO”) blamed the insurance industry for the high prices of the 
                                                                                                                 
 11 See Bach et al., supra note 2. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Under the Medicare program, doctors who administer in-office drugs, which includes many 
cancer doctors, get reimbursed based upon the price of the drug itself. See Medicare Part B Drugs 
Payment Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (June 14, 2016), https://innovation.
cms.gov/initiatives/part-b-drugs [https://perma.cc/3SLJ-AW3U]. Administering a more expensive 
drug thus brings a bigger profit for the physician. 
 15 See Bach et al., supra note 2. 
 16 Editorial, Incredible Prices for Cancer Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/11/13/opinion/incredible-prices-for-cancer-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/Q7HP-
4H5L] (“There are few constrains on escalating cancer drug prices in the current health care mar-
ket. That will need to change. Sloan-Kettering has shown what the medical profession can do to 
reduce costs if it has a mind to.”). 
 17 Rena Conti & Ernst Berndt, Winners and Losers from the Zaltrap Price Discount: Unin-
tended Consequences?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/
20/winners-and-losers-from-the-zaltrap-price-discount-unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.
cc/7M9U-F7Y3] (“Second, the episode underlines the fact that the threat of formulary coverage 
exclusion (in this case, by a prominent hospital) appears to have been an effective tool in altering 
the acquisition price of a branded physician-administered cancer drug in the U.S. It remains to be 
seen whether oncologists, other physician groups, hospitals and commercial insurers will increas-
ingly exert their newly-found leverage to influence the price setting of other branded specialty 
pharmaceuticals in the U.S.”). 
 18 See Incredible Prices for Cancer Drugs, supra note 16. 
 19 See Jacqueline Dooley, Dear America, Don’t Get Sick, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG 
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacqueline-dooley/dear-america-dont-get-sic_b_
8095440.html [https://perma.cc/2RYP-X9JU]. 
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drugs.20 The doctors had started a conversation, and had demonstrated 
something important. 
The only thing more stunning than Sloan-Kettering’s decision to ex-
clude Zaltrap from its formulary was the reaction to the doctors’ actions by 
the drug’s pharmaceutical manufacturer, Sanofi.21 Within one month of The 
New York Times op-ed, Sanofi cut the price of Zaltrap in half.22 Sanofi 
would lower Zaltrap’s price—at least for the first few months after the an-
nouncement—through a discount provided to doctors and hospitals but not 
to patients or to insurance programs.23 
Sloan-Kettering’s decision to forcefully push back against the price of 
Zaltrap demonstrated how instrumental doctors and hospitals can—and, 
perhaps, must—be in the fight to limit rising expenditures in American 
health care. Indeed, long the hub in the administration and coordination of 
health care, physicians have been the target of policy changes that seek to 
control runaway costs,24 but what occurred at Sloan-Kettering appeared to 
demonstrate something more powerful. The Zaltrap story seemed to prove, 
at least in the context of expensive pharmaceutical drugs, that if the expert 
party can change their belief about the effectiveness of a drug or the value 
of a procedure—while considering, or even due to, the cost of that drug or 
procedure—then achieving cost effectiveness without hard legal interven-
tion may be a viable pathway in American medicine. If the administrator 
and deliverer of health care services care about cost, then the American 
health care system becomes more efficient. 
By pushing Sanofi into cutting the price of Zaltrap, the physicians had 
achieved something no government entity had successfully accomplished. 
Indeed, left on the sidelines—impotent to control the runaway costs of 
                                                                                                                 
 20 See Bill Flook, BIO Pushes Back on ‘60 Minutes’ Report on Cancer Drug Costs, Shifts Blame 
to Insurers, WASH. BUS. J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/
blog/techflash/2014/10/bio-pushes-back-on-60-minutes-report-on-cancer.html. 
 21 See Stahl, supra note 3. 
 22 See Andrew Pollack, Sanofi Halves Price of Cancer Drug Zaltrap After Sloan-Kettering 
Rejection, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/business/sanofi-
halves-price-of-drug-after-sloan-kettering-balks-at-paying-it.html [https://perma.cc/ZL6V-EJRT]. 
 23 Id.; see also Conti & Berndt, supra note 17 (noting that the discount process that occurred 
after Sanofi cut the price of Zaltrap caused taxpayers and Medicare to overpay and “suggests an-
other reason for policy makers to shorten the lag”). 
 24 See, e.g., Jason Millman, The Obama Administration Wants to Dramatically Change How 
Doctors Are Paid, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2015/01/26/the-obama-administration-wants-to-dramatically-change-how-doctors-
are-paid/ [https://perma.cc/3DQS-7R54] (noting the changes brought about by the Obama admin-
istration, most specifically, the “high-profile effort” of “accountable care organizations (ACOs), 
which are groups of providers who share in the savings—or losses—for managing patients on a 
budget”). As of early 2015, nearly eight million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that 
were part of the ACO program. Id. 
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drugs25—Medicare, the insurance provider for more than fifty-five million 
Americans,26 continues to look for a way to limit rising costs. Truly bending 
the cost curve, the three doctors had accomplished something in one month 
that Medicare had been attempting for decades. The action seemed to un-
lock an unknown potential of the physician and the physician alone; the 
legal and regulatory schemas constructed over the last fifty-one years—and 
even the last eighty-two months27—were of no import. 
Through the first six-plus years of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
era, a debate has centered on what type and amount of governmental regula-
tion is appropriate and necessary to wring out unnecessary costs and utiliza-
tion from American health care. Even though the ACA has provoked this 
debate, it has not answered the question.28 With the ACA’s future in doubt, 
the future of cost control is even more uncertain. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to pharmaceutical drugs, the ACA has not ushered in a new era of 
                                                                                                                 
 25 In its Prescription Drug Benefit Plan of Medicare Part D, Medicare is statutorily prevented 
from negotiating with drug companies. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for 
Savings in Medicare Drug Price Negotiations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2016), http://kff.org/
medicare/issue-brief/searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug-price-negotiations/ [https://perma.cc/
HH57-MWJG]. As mentioned: 
Notably, Congress added language to the MMA, known as the “noninterference” 
clause, which stipulates that the HHS Secretary “may not interfere with the negotia-
tions between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors, and may not 
require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of 
covered part D drugs.” In effect, this provision means that the government can have 
no role in negotiating or setting drug prices in Medicare Part D. This is in stark con-
trast to how drug prices are determined in some other federal programs; for exam-
ple, the statutory requirement for mandatory drug price rebates in Medicaid, and a 
requirement that drug manufacturers charge the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) no more than the lowest price paid by any private-sector purchaser. 
Id. Nevertheless, whether or not the Secretary were to receive such ability, it appears that price 
setting, exclusion, and other techniques may achieve real drug savings. Id.; see also Editorial, Use 
Medicare’s Muscle to Lower Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/21/opinion/use-medicares-muscle-to-lower-drug-prices.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/V9FM-
NNFP]. 
 26 Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2015), http://kff.org/
medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/ [https://perma.cc/4J4N-WTQ8]. 
 27 President Obama signed the ACA into law on March 23, 2010, roughly eighty-two months 
ago. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a 
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.
html [https://perma.cc/3B28-PKM4]. 
 28 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, How the High Costs of Medicare Care Is Affecting Americans, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/18/health/cost-of-health-
care-poll.html [https://perma.cc/BPW8-YR9Z] (“While the Affordable Care Act has expanded 
insurance to millions of Americans, including those with existing conditions, it does not directly 
address cost. And cost is becoming increasingly problematic.”). 
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tighter governmental regulation and cost control in American health care.29 
Many of the pervasive, uniquely American problems regarding excess cost 
remain, seemingly spurred by a complex relationship between government 
intervention and medical and corporate autonomy. 
Mindful of the nuance that is required to regulate such a complex in-
dustry, these tensions make it difficult for a blunt instrument like the law to 
effectively limit excessive cost and utilization. The tension also tracks the 
professional and regulatory rivalry between medicine and law; borne out of 
societal values that view providers as impenetrably independent, citizens 
hold deep concerns about a medical system that is controlled by a faceless 
bureaucracy.30 The opposite and pervasive concern, however, features 
threats from an insular and self-interested medical profession, incentivized 
to excessively treat and overcharge, with monopolistic control of clinical 
expertise and medical decision making. In effect, the tension has paralyzed 
the law in its effort to effectively prevent overtreatment with precision and 
fairness. As a result, one in three dollars spent every year on American 
health care may be wasted.31 
For their part, federal prosecutors have relied on powerful anti-fraud 
tools available to them in an attempt to crack down on unnecessary utiliza-
tion and expense. Nevertheless, this has resulted in a haphazardly regulated 
web of individuals and entities with incentives and penalties pushing pro-
viders in opposite directions, draconian statutory anti-fraud penalties that 
seem to apply unevenly, and aggressive prosecutions that seek to stretch 
legal tools to, and perhaps, beyond, their limits. The anti-fraud tools are 
likely to fail in deterring overtreatment because they were never meant to 
apply to the overtreatment problem in the first place. Indeed, recent scholar-
ship has sought to bring balance to a legal regulatory framework that seems 
                                                                                                                 
 29 See Caitlin Owens, Why Prescription Drugs Aren’t Part of Obamacare, MORNING CON-
SULT (Mar. 24, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/03/24/why-prescription-drugs-arent-part-
of-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/SL78-9YRS]. 
After six years, the Affordable Care Act has extended health care coverage to millions 
of people. But affordability problems remain, most prominently in the area of prescrip-
tion drugs. Obamacare left the pharmaceutical industry largely unregulated while re-
quiring it to pay for some of the law’s increased drug coverage . . . . [D]rug companies 
are largely unregulated. They can set their own prices. There are no restrictions on 
profit margins. And there is very little transparency into the pricing process. 
Id. 
 30 Although the future of the ACA is uncertain, as of the fall of 2016, still only 44% of the 
American public supported the Affordable Care Act, with 51% opposed to it. See More Americans 
Negative Than Positive About ACA, GALLUP (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/195383/
americans-negative-positive-aca.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y3LW-5K5D]. 
 31 See Nicole Caferella Lallemand, Reducing Waste in Health Care, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF, 
HEALTH AFF., Dec. 13, 2012, at 1 (noting that “a third or more of what the US spends annually 
may be wasteful”). 
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to lack it: noting that the federal government should (1) recalibrate its fraud 
and abuse enforcement mechanism due to the threat of over-enforcement,32 
(2) refocus its anti-fraud efforts on excessive utilization instead of care that 
allegedly lacks medical necessity,33 (3) empower patients through bolstered 
informed consent to limit excessive health care,34 and (4) consider moving 
toward a payer-provider fiduciary model in Medicare.35 
Beyond trying to improve an imperfect system, however, the Sloan-
Kettering case teaches policy makers and legal academics something even 
more profound. Instead of fixing a disordered enforcement framework, or 
exploring new legal theories to attempt to rein in overtreatment, Sloan-
Kettering teaches that providers themselves—outside of, apart from, and, 
indeed, truly independent of the anti-fraud context—have access to un-
tapped power in reining in excess spending. It shows that if providers can 
be pushed to inculcate an ethic of cost into the provision of expensive 
health care and, subsequently, truly equate expensive care with substandard 
care, providers themselves can provide a roadmap to a more cost-effective 
health care marketplace. The lesson from New York may be that to effec-
tively prevent overtreatment and truly bend the cost curve, law’s chief goal 
may be to push doctors into being as mindful about excess cost and utiliza-
tion as were the doctors at Sloan-Kettering—relying on tools that are locat-
ed outside of the law. 
Additionally, there may be an opening here. New thinking on the topic 
demonstrates the unsurprising but startling conclusion that, after all, expen-
sive care is bad care.36 Recent studies on “financial toxicity”—the stunning 
phenomenon that patients who are saddled with exorbitant medical costs 
actually experience worse health outcomes as a result of the cost of their 
care—suggest that treating a patient with an expensive pharmaceutical drug 
is not just bad for Medicare or the patient’s financial wellbeing, but it may 
be bad for the patient’s health as well.37 If one can make the argument that 
choosing expensive drugs subjects the patient to untenable side effects 
(based upon the effect of the care on one’s financial wellbeing, and there-
fore, one’s physical health), then doctors have a duty to the patient to be 
                                                                                                                 
 32 See Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care Fraud Regulation in an Era of 
Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REV. 259, 270–71 (2015). 
 33 See Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever: A New Construct for Regulation Overtreatment, 48 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1297–1307 (2015). 
 34 See Isaac D. Buck, Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to Un-
wanted and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. L. REV. 901, 940–56. 
 35 See Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duties of Providers to the 
Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1083–93 (2016). 
 36 Johnson, supra note 9 (“[A] growing body of evidence suggests that, far from crass, ignor-
ing cost could be harmful to patients’ health.”). 
 37 See id. 
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aware of, and probably avoid, treatments and drugs for their patients that 
are not cost effective. Mirroring the traditional medical malpractice regime, 
physicians who subject their patients to side effects that may harm their 
health may face common law legal liability. From this perspective, over-
treatment regulation could migrate into malpractice regulation, finally spur-
ring the type of legal development and direct focus that rising health care 
costs surely need. 
This Article explores that argument. By pointing to the effects of fi-
nancial toxicity and relying on the burgeoning scholarly field of new gov-
ernance for doctrinal guidance, this Article makes the argument that a solu-
tion to America’s unsustainable overtreatment problem may actually come 
from outside of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or even the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). Perhaps, buoyed by the increas-
ing understanding of the negative health effects caused by excess cost, the 
answer to overtreatment relies upon making the argument to providers that 
overly expensive care is harmful to the patient. This new regime would reg-
ulate overtreatment by relying on incentives, pressure, and collaboration, all 
while moving away from adversarial legalism, as part of a larger effort to 
push providers into replicating what the three doctors at Sloan-Kettering 
did. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a snapshot of the 
current state of American health care, particularly focused on the drivers of 
its cost.38 Part II summarizes the long history of Medicare drug reimburse-
ment policy, with a particular focus on a segment of Medicare reimburse-
ment, Medicare Part B, which has garnered national attention due to recent 
events.39 Part III presents the phenomenon of financial toxicity.40 Finally, 
Part IV places the effect of financial toxicity on the law with the doctrinal 
support of new governance, accompanied by an argument that instantiation 
of the concern of cost—embedded within the clinical standard of care—
may be the best way out of America’s overtreatment challenge.41 
I. THE COST OF HEALTH 
Over six years after the passage of the imperiled ACA bolstered and 
reconstructed health care delivery, coverage, and access, the health care cost 
crisis has only grown in intensity.42 Millions of Americans face rising drug 
                                                                                                                 
 38 See infra notes 42–88 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 89–212 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 213–270 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 271–293 and accompanying text. 
 42 See Chad Terhune, U.S. Health Spending Hits $3 Trillion as Obamacare and Rising Drug 
Costs Kick in, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/healthcare/
la-fi-health-spending-increase-20151202-story.html [https://perma.cc/U6J8-5T33] (noting that 
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costs, higher deductibles,43 escalating premiums, and, increasingly, unsus-
tainable copays.44 For sure, the ACA pumped people into the insurance 
marketplace,45 expanded access for millions of lower-income Americans 
through Medicaid,46 reformed the character of the insurance plans sold on 
that health insurance marketplace,47 and funded efforts to creatively explore 
different reimbursement mechanisms,48 but did not apply any cost controls 
to the price of health care.49 Nor did the ACA’s structure that built upon 
                                                                                                                 
America spent more than $9500 per person on health care in 2014, “far higher than what other 
developed countries pay”). Government officials have noted, however, that the increase in annual 
health care costs was less than it would have been without the Affordable Care Act. Id. 
 43 See Robert Pear, Many Say High Deductibles Make Their Health Law Insurance All but 
Useless, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/us/politics/many-say-
high-deductibles-make-their-health-law-insurance-all-but-useless.html [https://perma.cc/Q2J8-2T9E] 
(noting the story of individuals who cannot afford to use insurance due to their high deductibles, 
and finding that “more than half the plans offered for sale through HealthCare.gov . . . have a 
deductible of $3,000 or more”); see also Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health 
Reform Issue for Ordinary Americans, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://healthaffairs.
org/blog/2016/02/29/affordability-the-most-urgent-health-reform-issue-for-ordinary-americans/ 
[https://perma.cc/VES7-D9YR] (noting that many Americans living well-above the poverty line 
“do not have enough to even pay for the deductible of their coverage, much less the out-of-pocket 
limit”). Further, the “standard silver plan deductibles for individuals without cost-sharing reduc-
tions average above $3,000, a greater amount than many families have available in liquid assets.” 
Jost, supra. 
 44 Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle with High Drug Prices, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2015, 
10:38 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices-1451557981 [https://
perma.cc/CH7N-FKPH] (noting that “the expense of new cancer drugs is burdensome for growing 
numbers of patients whose insurance entails substantial copays”). 
 45 More than twelve million Americans purchased a health insurance plan on a health insur-
ance exchange during the open enrollment period in 2016. Health Insurance Marketplace Open 
Enrollment Snapshot—Week 13, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://
www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2016-Fact-sheets-items/2016-02-04.
html [https://perma.cc/E69G-V8VH] (noting that 12.7 million Americans had signed up for insur-
ance plans through the health insurance marketplaces during the open enrollment period that end-
ed at the end of January). 
 46 As of the fall of 2016, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had expanded their 
Medicaid programs. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-
medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/HA6N-FX5A]. The four states with the 
largest uninsured population as a percentage of state population in 2016—Texas, Georgia, Okla-
homa, and Florida—were all non-expansion states. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Popu-
lation, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ [https://
perma.cc/RF86-4HQW]. In 2014, Texas alone had over four million residents who were unin-
sured. See id. 
 47 See Health Insurance Market Reforms, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/ [https://perma.
cc/73Q3-RMXY] (briefly providing a synopsis of reforms). 
 48 See, e.g., Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-aco-model/ [https://perma.cc/8MMQ-4UP9] (providing de-
tails of the Pioneer ACO Model). 
 49 In the summer of 2016, President Obama made a compelling case for the creation of the 
public option within the ACA. See Paul Demko, Obamacare’s Sinking Safety Net, POLITICO (July 
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America’s private insurance delivery system—unlike, for example, a Euro-
pean single payer regime or even a public option—allow for concerted gov-
ernmental intervention regarding the price of health care itself. 
In some ways, the failure of the United States to adequately address its 
unsustainable health care finance system may be characterized as a failure 
of law, but inaction on the cost crisis is due to a number of recognizable 
societal tensions. In some corners, the cost challenge seems to be borne out 
of a fear of overregulating and inappropriately constraining a private indus-
try—any private industry, no matter how purportedly “greedy” it is.50 Relat-
edly, perhaps there is concern involved with empowering a government 
body to seek to cut costs in a country that values personal and corporate 
freedom. Additional challenges uniquely suited to health care persist: (1) 
health care is deeply personal and vital to one’s identity and self, (2) reim-
bursement and monetary incentives are not always aligned to limit cost 
growth, and (3) health care is not easily standardized or reducible to gov-
ernment-enforced standards. 
As new research continues to show, America’s health care cost crisis 
can be blamed on two overlapping but general causes: (1) high prices and 
(2) excess utilization.51 In an era of dramatic reform, neither of the causes 
has been adequately addressed by law. Some of the ACA’s reforms did seek 
to incentivize providers to become more cost-conscious of the care they 
provide. For instance, those who enroll in Accountable Care Organizations 
(“ACOs”) and in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”) have an 
incentive to be more aware of cost,52 but the reforms are limited, and many 
                                                                                                                 
13, 2016, 4:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/07/obamacare-exchanges-states-
north-carolina-000162 [https://perma.cc/LKV8-TA9K] (highlighting the plight of insurance com-
panies that have signed up for the individual exchange, the smaller than expected enrollment 
numbers, and the reinvigoration of the push toward a public option). 
 50 See Dan Diamond, Greedy Pharma CEO Cancels 5,000% Price Hike—But He Didn’t Fix 
the Real Problem, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2015, 11:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/
2015/09/22/greedy-pharma-executive-cancels-5000-price-hike-but-he-didnt-fix-the-real-problem/
#5a061d2d2a26 [http://web.archive.org/web/20160903131414/http://www.forbes.com/sites/dan
diamond/2015/09/22/greedy-pharma-executive-cancels-5000-price-hike-but-he-didnt-fix-the-real-
problem/#66870301e42b]; Jeffrey Young, Pharma Bro Emails Reveal Just How Greedy Drug 
Companies Can Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/martin-shkreli-pharma-bro-drug-prices_us_56b0fac5e4b0655877f75453 [https://perma.cc/
9ESR-WEN6] . 
 51 Atul Gawande, Health Care’s Price Conundrum, NEW YORKER (Dec. 18, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/health-cares-cost-conundrum-squared [https://perma.cc/8834-
KT76] (noting that Medicare’s costs are impacted by utilization, whereas private insurance costs 
are impacted most by pricing and consolidation). 
 52 Nevertheless, this is a voluntary program, and early results from the MSSP are mixed, to 
say the least. See Buck, supra note 34, at 933. 
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are voluntary.53 As a result, the new tools put in place by the ACA likely do 
not go far enough. 
Section A discusses the first cause of the increasing price of health 
care, high prices, including the impact of providers’ horizontal and vertical 
consolidation.54 Section B describes the second driving of increasing health 
care costs, high utilization.55 Section C finally discusses the interplay be-
tween the two factors.56 
A. High Prices 
First, America’s health care cost crisis is largely caused by incompara-
bly high and opaque prices, particularly from hospitals.57 Uncapped, health 
care prices, the costs that hospitals and pharmaceutical companies charge 
for surgeries, pills, and even paper clips, are just “too damn high.”58 Ameri-
cans have known for years that the price of the health care they receive—
the sticker price for health care procedures and drugs—far outpaces the 
costs of health care in other peer countries.59 Whereas other countries rely 
on rate setting or government negotiation to control the cost of health care, 
America has no such control of its fragmented marketplace.60 
A central reason U.S. health care spending is so high is that hospi-
tals and doctors charge more for their services and there’s little 
transparency about why . . . . The result is a tangled, confusing 
and largely secretive collection of forces driving health care pric-
                                                                                                                 
 53 See, e.g., Overview of Select Alternative Payment Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2016-
Fact-sheets-items/2016-03-03.html [https://perma.cc/3CUE-DC5X] (noting that “[p]rovider par-
ticipation in an ACO is purely voluntary”). 
 54 See infra notes 57–74 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
 57 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 
15 (2014) (“Despite the enormous administrative costs exacted by this complicated pricing sys-
tem, hospitals have incentives to inflate the chargemaster to increase bargaining leverage over 
health plans and maximize profit.”). 
 58 David Wolman, Drug Prices Are Too Damn High. Here’s How to Fix Them, WIRED (Dec. 1, 
2015, 6:40 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/rising-drug-costs/ [https://perma.cc/5U94-4S98]; 
see Matthew Yglesias, Health Care Is Expensive Because the Prices Are High, SLATE (Feb. 16, 
2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/02/16/health_care_is_expensive_
because_the_prices_are_high.html [https://perma.cc/D3NQ-EUZR]. 
 59 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Paying Till It Hurts (series), N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013–Dec. 
18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/health/paying-till-it-hurts.html [https://perma.
cc/J5MB-BZ3W] (detailing high cost of health care in the United States, compared to other coun-
tries). 
 60 See Kate Pickert, Why Our Health Care Lets Prices Run Wild, TIME (July 1, 2013), http://
swampland.time.com/2013/07/01/why-our-health-care-lets-prices-run-wild/ [https://perma.cc/7HGE-
UDRD]. 
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es higher and higher. This isn’t possible in many other countries 
either because governments set prices for health care services or 
broker negotiations between coalitions of insurers and providers. 
Known as “all-payer rate setting,” insurers in these systems band 
together to negotiate as groups.61 
The American problem is due to more than just regulatory inaction, 
however; providers, hospitals, and systems are merging and consolidating, 
and this has likely intensified the price crisis by saturating markets.62 Further, 
largely due to cost pressures, more than fifty rural hospitals have closed since 
2010, additionally removing competitors of the large hospital systems, and, of 
course, dramatically threatening access for rural Americans.63 
The staggering connection between consolidation in the marketplace 
and higher prices in health care has most recently been demonstrated by a 
compelling 2015 study by the Health Care Pricing Project.64 The study con-
cluded “hospital prices in monopoly markets [were] 15.3 percent higher 
than those in markets with four or more hospitals.”65 Further, “[m]arkets 
with two hospitals had prices roughly six percent higher than those with 
four or more hospitals,” and “[t]hree-hospital towns had prices about five 
percent higher than those with at least four hospitals.”66 Indeed, according 
to another 2012 study, when hospitals in concentrated markets merge, “the 
price increase can be dramatic, often exceeding 20 percent.”67 
                                                                                                                 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Melanie Evans, Data Suggest Hospital Consolidation Drives Higher Prices for Pri-
vately Insured, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20151215/NEWS/151219906 [https://perma.cc/43SC-KYLP] (noting that “[t]he findings are sig-
nificant as hospitals across the country continue a deal binge that has consolidated markets and 
created new regional giants”). 
 63 See Paul Demko, As Rural Hospitals Struggle, Solutions Sought to Preserve Healthcare 
Access, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 16, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150516/
MAGAZINE/305169959 [https://perma.cc/34CW-FLFC]; see also N. Douthit et al., Exposing Some 
Important Barriers to Health Care Access in the Rural USA, 129 PUB. HEALTH 611, 611 (2015) 
(finding that rural Americans are reluctant to seek health care “based on cultural and financial con-
straints, often compounded by a scarcity of services, a lack of trained physicians, insufficient public 
transport, and poor availability of broadband internet services”); Molly O’Toole, Rural Americans 
Face Greater Lack of Healthcare Access, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-rural-idUSTRE76Q0MJ20110727 [https://perma.cc/CH2U-MRKK]. 
 64 See Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the 
Privately Insured 6–7 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Health Care Pricing 
Project). 
 65 Id. at i (alteration in original). This amounts to about $2000 more per hospital admission. 
See Evans, supra note 62. 
 66 Evans, supra note 62. 
 67 Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation—Update, ROBERT 
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., June 2012, at 1, http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_
briefs/2012/rwjf73261 [https://perma.cc/3PZM-R899]. 
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Within the American health care industry, consolidation is well under-
way, and it is accelerating.68 Hospitals are consolidating both “vertically” 
and “horizontally,”69 with more than one hundred mergers and deals closed 
in 2014, which was a substantial increase over 2013.70 Stunningly, at the 
beginning of this millennium, “one in 20 specialists were hospital employ-
ees; now the ratio is one in four.”71 In 2014, Deloitte made the bold predic-
tion that “[i]f horizontal consolidation continues during the coming decade 
. . . likely only fifty percent of today’s unique health systems are expected 
to remain.”72 This “rapid consolidation” poses risks to the marketplace, 
most specifically the “effect on rising prices,” largely due to the effect con-
solidation has on “the increased bargaining power it can give health systems 
in contract negotiations, which plans assert, may increase consumer pric-
es.”73 When it comes to cost, providers, hospitals, and pharmaceutical com-
panies own an increasing amount of the leverage, whereas insurance com-
panies, government programs, and patients in the fragmented American 
health care marketplace have increasingly limited options other than simply 
paying more for health care each year.74 
                                                                                                                 
 68 See Melanie Evans, Consolidation Creating Giant Hospital Systems, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(June 21, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140621/MAGAZINE/306219980 
[https://perma.cc/W5V9-D4WH] (“Large regional and national healthcare systems are getting 
bigger and markets are increasingly consolidating, Modern Healthcare’s annual survey of hospital 
systems shows.”). 
 69 Hospital Consolidation: Can It Work This Time?, KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON (May 11, 
2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/hospital-consolidation-can-it-work-this-time/ 
[https://perma.cc/K58C-LLHE]; see also Gaynor & Town, supra note 67, at 3 (noting “limited 
data” demonstrates that vertical consolidation is “increasing”). 
 70 See David Brodwin, Death by Monopoly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 17, 2015, 8:30 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/08/17/health-care-consolidation-
is-a-disease-not-a-cure [https://perma.cc/8T7T-R2JF]. 
 71 Id. 
 72 The Great Consolidation: The Potential for Rapid Consolidation of Health Systems, 
DELOITTE, 2014, at 9. 
 73 Id. at 1, 13. 
 74 Interestingly, major health insurance companies have announced mergers that have been 
challenged by the DOJ during the summer of 2016 in court. See Leslie Picker & Reed Abelson, 
U.S. Sues to Block Anthem-Cigna and Aetna-Humana Mergers, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/dealbook/us-sues-to-block-anthem-cigna-and-aetna-
humana-mergers.html [https://perma.cc/KD29-RUXM] (noting Attorney General Lynch as saying, 
“If these mergers were to take place, the competition among insurers that has pushed them to 
provide lower premiums, higher-quality care and better benefits would be eliminated . . . .”). The 
increased cost of health coverage, and the fact that the exchanges created under the ACA have 
been sicker than anticipated, has led the largest health insurance company in the United States to 
end its participation in a majority of health care exchanges. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, UnitedHealth 
Group to Exit Obamacare Exchanges in All but a “Handful” of States, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG 
(Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/19/unitedhealth-group-
to-exit-obamacare-exchanges-in-all-but-a-handful-of-states/ [https://perma.cc/VLX4-PA7R] (not-
ing that this decision was made based on the fact that United was losing money on the exchanges, 
and has “reported that it expects to lose $650 million in the exchanges in 2016”). 
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B. High Utilization 
Second, the entities providing health care in America are providing too 
much of it.75 This cause largely impacts the rising costs of Medicare each 
year; indeed, Medicare has the ability to set rates for procedures and health 
care goods, but, as explored more deeply below, it cannot set, nor negotiate, 
rates for pharmaceutical drugs in Part D.76 Nonetheless, for the regions of 
the country with the highest Medicare bills, the global cost of health care is 
due to the amount of health care that is provided in those regions.77 
Utilization challenges, however, exist outside of Medicare as well.78 
The total number of scans and tests performed in the United States contin-
ues at staggering rates,79 and Americans do not experience better health as a 
result.80 The causes of overutilization-based overtreatment are multifacet-
                                                                                                                 
 75 See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Over-
treatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 473–79 (2013). 
 76 See Philip Moeller, Column: Why Does Medicare Allow for the Price Gouging of Prescription 
Drugs?, PBS (Oct. 7, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/medicare-allow-
price-gouging-prescription-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4Y-CC37]. 
 77 See Buck, supra note 35, at 1047–49; Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER 
(June 1, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum [https://
perma.cc/6ME6-4JCP]  
 78 See Buck, supra note 75, at 463 (noting the amount of excess utilization within American 
health care). 
 79 See Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande [https://perma.cc/V8PM-X85Z]. 
The United States is a country of three hundred million people who annually under-
go around fifteen million nuclear medicine scans, a hundred million CT and MRI 
scans, and almost ten billion laboratory tests. Often, these are fishing expeditions, 
and since no one is perfectly normal you tend to find a lot of fish. If you look closely 
and often enough, almost everyone will have a little nodule that can’t be completely 
explained, a lab result that is a bit off, a heart tracing that doesn’t look quite right. 
Excessive testing is a problem for a number of reasons. For one thing, some diag-
nostic studies are harmful in themselves—we’re doing so many CT scans and other 
forms of imaging that rely on radiation that they are believed to be increasing the 
population’s cancer rates. These direct risks are often greater than we account for. 
What’s more, the value of any test depends on how likely you are to be having a 
significant problem in the first place. If you have crushing chest pain and shortness 
of breath, you start with a high likelihood of having a serious heart condition, and an 
electrocardiogram has significant value. . . . But, if you have no signs or symptoms 
of heart trouble, an electrocardiogram adds no useful information; a heart tracing 
that doesn’t look quite right is mostly noise. Experts recommend against doing elec-
trocardiograms on healthy people, but millions are done each year, anyway. 
Id. 
 80 See Grace Rubenstein, New Health Rankings: Of 17 Nations, U.S. Is Dead Last, THE AT-
LANTIC (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/01/new-health-rankings-
of-17-nations-us-is-dead-last/267045/ [https://perma.cc/EN5U-GDB7]; David Squires & Chloe 
Anderson, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-health-care-from-a-
global-perspective [https://perma.cc/ZY5L-ETEZ] (“[D]espite its heavy investment in health care, 
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ed—from financial inducements, to fragmentation and “siloization” in the 
health care delivery system, to liability concerns and defensive medicine, to 
America’s technological arms race.81 All these causes lead to rampant 
overutilization of medical services, shepherded by a medical community 
that seems too infrequently interested in controlling the amount of health 
care that is provided each year, let alone its cost. 
C. Interplay Between Prices and Utilization 
Combining both of the causes of rising costs makes for a multifaceted 
challenge facing health care law and policy experts. A policy meant to solve 
one of the causes may exacerbate the other. This is particularly true when 
one examines the ACA-based reforms that are intended to encourage col-
laboration between providers and entities in ACOs, for instance.82 
On one hand, the formation of ACOs may encourage providers and en-
tities to be better stewards of health care resources by being more sensitive 
to the amount of health care they provide; indeed, they are financially in-
centivized to collaborate and cut down on fragmentation and unnecessary 
services.83 A potential byproduct of that incentive may push providers into 
formal collaboration in new networks or mergers, which would instead lead 
to further consolidation of the market, and may directly result in higher 
prices.84 When and whether a market could be benefitted or harmed by in-
creased consolidation is “not always the same because it depends on the 
environment in which consolidation occurs.”85 Excess utilization and excess 
price are different species, and the treatment for one may worsen the other. 
For its part on both causes, the law has been unable to adequately 
solve the challenge. Perhaps this is due to the fact that there is no federal 
                                                                                                                 
the U.S. sees poorer results on several key health outcome measures such as life expectancy and 
the prevalence of chronic conditions.”). 
 81 See Buck, supra note 75, at 473–79. 
 82 See Millman, supra note 24. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 
310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1964, 1964 (Nov. 2013). 
Policy makers both revere and revile these health systems. On the one hand, lack of 
coordination has long been seen as a key failure of US health care. Integrated health 
systems have the capacity to address the quality deficiency resulting from lack of 
coordination. On the other hand, health systems can become so large that they are 
able to increase prices, harming consumers and taxpayers. Thus, there are increasing 
calls for greater antitrust scrutiny of hospital systems. 
Id. 
 85 Id. at 1970. 
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statutory scheme that is dedicated to capping overly expensive prices,86 nor 
one specifically focused on reining in non-fraudulent unnecessary costs or 
procedures in American health care.87 This is particularly true when it 
comes to the cost of prescription drugs in America’s health care system. An 
exploration of the regulatory environment for the cost of pharmaceutical 
drugs, specifically Medicare Part B’s history of price regulation, follows.88 
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
In late September 2015, newspapers and magazines plastered the face 
of the thirty-one year-old CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals (“Turing”), Mar-
tin Shkreli, across their pages.89 Turing, an infantile pharmaceutical compa-
ny,90 had just acquired the rights to Daraprim, a drug used to treat HIV in-
fections, and had raised its price by 5000% overnight.91 Immediately, Tu-
                                                                                                                 
 86 Maryland is currently the only state that requires all parties to pay the same amount for 
health care. See Maryland All-Payer Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-Model/ [https://perma.cc/FBR7-
9VC9] (“Maryland operates the nation’s only all-payer hospital rate regulation system.”). 
 87 See Buck, supra note 75, at 479–82 (noting how the anti-fraud statutes are not a substitute 
for a scheme focused on limiting overutilization). 
 88 See infra notes 89–212 and accompanying text. 
 89 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, CEO Who Raised Price of Old Pill More Than $700 Calls Journal-
ist a “Moron” for Asking Why, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/to-your-health/wp/2015/09/21/ceo-of-company-that-raised-the-price-of-old-pill-hundreds-of-
dollars-overnight-calls-journalist-a-moron-for-asking-why/ [https://perma.cc/N48H-RVUJ]; An-
drew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-
protests.html [https://perma.cc/27BM-HSKR]; Zoë Schlanger, Martin Shkreli on Raising Price of 
AIDS Drug 5,000 Percent: ‘I Think Profits Are a Great Thing,’ NEWSWEEK (Sept. 21, 2015, 5:39 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/martin-shkreli-daraprim-drug-prices-374922 [https://perma.cc/
5B6D-ULEL]. 
 90 See Arlene Weintraub, Gadfly Pharma Investor Shkreli Starts Anew After Ousting from 
Retrophin, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/arleneweintraub/2015/
02/27/gadfly-pharma-investor-shkreli-starts-anew-after-ousting-from-retrophin/#6928a92f359d 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160516123356/http://www.forbes.com/sites/arleneweintraub/2015/
02/27/gadfly-pharma-investor-shkreli-starts-anew-after-ousting-from-retrophin/#6eed528219f4] 
(“Shkreli this week unveiled his new company, Turing Pharmaceuticals, which he’s launching 
with three drugs acquired from Retrophin,” described as “a biotech startup he founded”). 
 91 See John Russell, After 5,000% Daraprim Hike, Pharma CEO ‘Would Have Raised Prices 
Higher,’ CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-turing-doubles-
down-1205-biz-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/HJK6-TEVW] (“‘I would have raised 
prices higher,’ [Shkreli] told an audience at the Forbes Healthcare Summit in New York, accord-
ing to Forbes.com. ‘That’s my duty.’ ‘My shareholders expect me to make the most profit,’ 
Shkreli added. ‘that’s the ugly, dirty truth.’”) (alteration in original); see also Matthew Herper, 
Martin Shkreli: ‘I Would’ve Raised Prices Higher,’ FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/video/46446
35141001/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160826113913/http://www.forbes.com/video/46446351
41001/]. 
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ring, and more specifically, the “live wire”92 and “unapologetic”93 Shkreli, 
was pushed into the national spotlight. 
Not only was the price increase indicative of corporate greed, newspa-
pers, websites, and magazines argued,94 but the usage of Daraprim, which 
treats infections that affect individuals with “compromised immune sys-
tems,” made the corporate policy seem even more immoral.95 Daraprim is a 
drug used to treat two infections caused by parasites, malaria and toxoplas-
ma,96 and particularly, the drug prevents “a nervous system infection in 
those with HIV.”97 Not only was Turing raising the price to an untenable 
level, they argued, but it was not doing it for a drug that treated allergies or 
colds; no, it was changing the price of a drug that Americans—many of 
whom had faced well-documented discrimination and societal exclusion 
and, as a result, access challenges—relied on to prevent deadly infections.98 
Nevertheless, by late November, Shkreli and Turing had offered a discount 
program for hospitals.99 
Throughout the fall, however, Shkreli became the bigger story.100 His 
combative response to the outrage gave the story immediate cache.101 At 
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times, his testimony on Capitol Hill seemed close to inciting a congression-
al riot.102 His backstory, including a past stint as a CEO of a company he 
started that was not lacking in controversy, added intrigue.103 Multiple out-
lets referred to him repeatedly as “pharma bro,” perhaps in an attempt to 
cast him as an unconcerned and amoral millennial lacking regard for the 
greater good.104 Other outlets called him the “most hated man in Ameri-
                                                                                                                 
#e81c50a2996c [http://web.archive.org/web/20161104071002/http://www.forbes.com/sites/arlene
weintraub/2015/11/19/heres-why-shkreli-is-going-to-have-his-hands-full-trying-to-save-kalobios/
#5fe5039a7ce2]. By December of that year, KaloBios had fired him as its CEO and filed for bank-
ruptcy. See KaloBios Pharmaceuticals Files for Bankruptcy in Wake of Shkreli Arrest, REUTERS 
(Dec. 30, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kalobios-bankruptcy-idUSKBN0UD
0ND20151230 [https://perma.cc/Y6PG-UFYP]. 
 101 Jonathan D. Rockoff, Martin Shkreli: From Biotech Entrepreneur to Accused Criminal, 
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 17, 2015, 5:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/martin-shkreli-from-
biotech-entrepreneur-to-accused-criminal-1450389335 [https://perma.cc/EUD6-U9JA]. 
In public, though, Mr. Shkreli is often outspoken and sometimes insulting. At the 
height of the recent controversy over the more than 50-fold increase in price his com-
pany instituted for the parasite drug Daraprim, Mr. Shkreli, on Twitter, dismissed one 
journalist as a “moron.” . . . Mr. Shkreli was similarly combative on the topic of Dara-
prim’s price hike. During a recent interview at the Forbes Healthcare Summit, Mr. 
Shkreli said he had an obligation to “maximize our profit” for his investors. 
Id. 
 102 See Laura Lorenzetti, How Martin Shkreli Is ‘Trashing’ the Pharma Industry, FORTUNE 
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/04/martin-shkreli-valeant-drug-price-hearing/ [https://
perma.cc/AFW8-NPMS] (noting that “the environment in the hearing was heated as lawmakers 
ranted about the out-of-control drug price increases on a series of off-patent drugs”). 
 103 See Weintraub, supra note 90 (noting that Shkreli’s “departure from the company was far 
from amicable”). Retrophin sued Shkreli for $65 million. Nate Raymond, Retrophin to Pay $3 
Million in U.S. Lawsuit Over Shkreli’s Tenure, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-retrophin-lawsuit-shkreli-idUSKCN0VC1K8 [https://perma.cc/3Q98-9KH3]. 
The company paid $3 million to settle a lawsuit, which alleged that the company did not disclose 
transactions that personally benefitted Shkreli during his tenure as CEO. See id. In the lawsuit 
against Shkreli, Retrophin alleged that the former CEO “was the paradigm faithless servant.” Dani 
Kass, Drugmaker Retrophin Sues Ex-CEO for $65M, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015), http://
www.law360.com/articles/691861/drugmaker-retrophin-sues-ex-ceo-for-65m [https://perma.cc/
YKZ2-DNK3]. 
 104 See Halimah Abdullah, ‘Pharma Bro’ Shkreli Invokes the Fifth Before Congress, NBC 
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ca.”105 The Shkreli saga had all the hallmarks of a compelling story: inno-
cent patients facing off against a heartless and brash CEO. 
Except that is the stuff of Hollywood. Aside from Shkreli’s uncommon 
personality, the main lesson of the Daraprim story should have been how 
ordinary both Shkreli’s and Turing’s actions were in the early fall of 
2015.106 Once the public got past the personal politics of the antagonist, an 
unabashed truism—that prices of pharmaceutical drugs are largely unregu-
lated and unlimited—should have made its way into American popular con-
sciousness by late 2015.107 What was stunning was that this truism also 
seemed to make its way into the consciousness of various members of Con-
gress at the same time.108 This, of course, is a Congress that has blocked the 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary from negotiating Medi-
care’s drug prices109 and has permitted such a system to take hold without 
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Id. (alteration in original). 
 109 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012). 
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any meaningful cost control of pharmaceutical drugs, acting unlike all other 
developed countries.110 
As a result, the autumnal obsession with Shkreli may have been mis-
guided, and Congressional criticism seemed hollow. As put by the New 
Yorker magazine: 
One of the strangest things about the anti-Shkreli argument is that it 
asks us to be shocked that a medical executive is motivated by 
profit. . . . A truly greedy executive would keep a much lower pro-
file than Shkreli: there would be no headline-grabbing exponential 
price hikes, just boring but reliable ticks upward; no interviews, no 
tweeting, and absolutely no hip-hop feuds. . . . By showing what is 
legal, he has helped us to think about what we might want to 
change, and what we might need to learn to live with.111 
The Shkreli saga ended in mid-December of 2015 when Shkreli was arrest-
ed for so-called “small-time hedge fund fraud.”112 
Shkreli was back in the news in February of 2016, when he was called 
to testify in front of Congress but refused, relying on his Fifth Amendment 
rights.113 Instead, he reportedly “smirked several times and appeared on the 
verge of laughter” in front of Congress.114 After the contentious meeting, 
Shkreli tweeted that it is “[h]ard to accept that these imbeciles represent the 
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people in our government.”115 Even in the wake of this attention, to date, 
Congress has taken no action to address pharmaceutical drug prices. 
Section A discusses the rapid growth and rising prices facing Medi-
care.116 Section B describes Medicare Part B’s history with prescription drug 
pricing.117 Section C details the relationship between Part B’s current reim-
bursement rate and utilization.118 Section D summarizes the lifecycle of an 
abandoned proposal to alter the Medicare Part B drug reimbursement rate.119 
A. The Uniquely Precarious Position of Medicare 
Nowhere are all of these cost tensions more prominent than in Ameri-
ca’s Medicare program. Taxpayer-financed Medicare is facing a fate similar 
to the individuals on the new health care insurance marketplace: with a 
blossoming enrollment and rising prices, the program is staring at decades 
of rapidly increasing costs.120 Not only is the Medicare budget growing, but 
the growth is projected to accelerate over the next decade.121 
Much of this cost crisis is due to enrollment growth. In a period that 
started in 2010 and will last until 2050, Medicare’s enrollment is projected 
to move from 47.7 million Americans to 92.4 million Americans.122 This is 
not just a systemic, academic concern; Medicare’s current beneficiaries will 
face the cost strain. It has already begun; Medicare’s Part B premiums alone 
rose sixteen percent from 2015 to 2016.123 With beneficiaries on the hook 
for twenty percent of drug costs, individuals are dedicating an increasing 
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percentage of their monthly budgets to prescription drug costs.124 To this 
point, the ACA’s reforms have done nothing to impact or slow this intensi-
fying crisis. 
Within the Medicare program, a major category of overtreatment re-
sults from inefficiently delivered care, excess care, and overpriced pharma-
ceutical drugs.125 Indeed, this seems to suggest that overtreatment is not as 
much driven by providers bent on defrauding the health care delivery sys-
tem as it is a result of an environment of non-regulation—a reimbursement 
methodology and Congress that pays too little attention to incentives, phar-
maceutical companies that naturally seek to increase profits,126 patients who 
too often equate cost with quality, and hospitals with a growing amount of 
market share and control over costs in the health care marketplace (particu-
larly when it comes to excess cost for those with private insurance plans).127 
It is a system that seems to have resulted due to inaction, and the law has 
not weeded this overgrown lot for decades. 
One example of a health policy problem that straddles the two chief 
causes of the cost crisis mentioned above—that prices are too high and that 
health care procedures is overused—can be found in the administration of 
pharmaceutical drugs within Medicare Part B. For example, Part B includes 
the scenario of a provider choosing an expensive drug instead of a clinically 
equivalent cheaper drug,128 where the excess cost is due to a provider’s de-
cision that may or may not be clinically justified. This problem may be 
compounded where usage of the drug itself may not be clinically required, 
and also includes the troubling challenge of the cost of pharmaceutical 
drugs’ list prices, which are easily into the tens of thousands per month.129 
Clinical care that reflects high prices and excess utilization, in addition to 
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clinically unjustified expense, is a common phenomenon within American 
health care. 
Notably, the ACA reforms do nothing to empower Medicare to negoti-
ate with drug companies, nor have they been successful in changing the cal-
culus facing providers who are choosing between differently priced, but 
similarly effective, pharmaceutical drugs. Without changing laws, incen-
tives, or norms within the provider’s decision-making process, providers 
have no reason to choose the cheaper drug, let alone to even know which 
drug is cheaper. 
The ACA’s silence on addressing increasing pharmaceutical drug costs, 
particularly within the Medicare program itself, continues a decades-old 
narrative about Medicare’s complicated history with drug pricing. Further, 
as the cost of health care increases—particularly for Part B drugs—
Medicare’s beneficiaries are increasingly facing rising costs for prescription 
drugs.130 When patients with fixed incomes face increasing prices for their 
drugs, the impacts are real and often devastating.131 
B. Medicare Part B’s History with Drug Pricing 
A cost crisis borne out of how Medicare Part B pays for its drugs is 
nothing new, but of particular recent interest to policy makers is how Medi-
care Part B pays for pharmaceutical drugs that are administered on an out-
patient, but in-office setting.132 Part B is implicated in many of the current 
cost control efforts, due to the still complex and antiquated reimbursement 
mechanism that governs it. Unfortunately, the battle to control Medicare’s 
Part B expenditures, and an inability to make headway in addressing the 
crisis, has been a similar narrative facing CMS for decades.133 This appears 
to be a narrative that features inattention to detail, powerful interests to pro-
tect, and, above all, political inaction. This mix led to the situation that 
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faced the doctors at Sloan-Kettering mentioned above.134 Nevertheless, de-
spite the current challenges associated with Medicare Part B reimburse-
ment, it is notable that reimbursement has actually improved over the last 
two decades. 
Specifically, for Medicare’s Part B reimbursement, until January 1, 
2005, the program paid for drugs under what was known as an average 
wholesale price (“AWP”) system.135 Medicare reimbursed physicians who 
administered drugs covered by Part B based upon what the AWP was for each 
covered drug. From January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2003, Medicare paid 
doctors either the lesser of the actual Medicare charge on the claim, or ninety-
five percent of the drug’s AWP.136 From January 1, 2004 to December 31, 
2004, Medicare limited its payments to eighty-five percent of the AWP.137 
The AWP system was ripe for potential abuse, largely because a par-
ticular prescription drug’s AWP often did not closely reflect its actual sales 
price.138 In effect, the acquisition cost—that is, the price that doctors paid 
for acquiring the drugs for administration in their offices—was untethered 
from the reimbursement formula under Medicare Part B.139 A settlement 
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and prominent class action litigated early in the new millennium shined a 
bright light on the fact that the Medicare reimbursement structure was, at 
best, woefully inefficient.140 
This AWP reimbursement mechanism, unsurprisingly, provided an 
opening for tremendous waste, particularly where pharmaceutical compa-
nies allegedly “marketed the spread,” a sales technique in which pharma-
ceutical sales representatives allegedly touted to physicians the steep differ-
ence between the drug’s acquisition cost that the physicians would pay and 
the amount that Medicare would reimburse.141 Allegedly seeking to impress 
upon them the amount of profit they could pocket for using their drugs, 
pharmaceutical companies allegedly had a powerful incentive to highlight 
Medicare’s seemingly broken reimbursement mechanism.142 Bizarrely, the 
problems associated with basing Medicare’s Part B reimbursement regime 
on AWP were well known, even during the AWP era.143  
There is widespread agreement that the published prices do not 
reflect the actual price at which many physicians are able to pur-
chase these products, due to volume discounts and other purchas-
ing incentives. Thus, reliance on published AWP may result in 
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actual price paid for many prescription drugs.”); Radio Address of President William J. Clinton 
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tors according to the published average wholesale price, the so-called sticker price for drugs. Few 
doctors, however, actually pay the full sticker price.”); see also In re Miss. Medicaid Pharm. Av-
erage Wholesale Price Litig., 190 So. 3d 829, 858 (Miss. 2015) (Lamar, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[d]uring the damages period, both President Clinton and Health and Human Services Secretary 
Donna Shalala publicly referred to AWP as a ‘sticker price’” in an effort to show that the federal 
government was aware that the reported AWP was not the same as the actual price of the pharma-
ceutical drugs). 
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payments that are significantly higher than what many physicians 
actually pay for the drug, resulting in a nice profit—or “kick-
back”—when the physician is reimbursed.144 
Again, the price at which a drug’s AWP was set was largely based on 
information directly provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers, and Medi-
care did not have any ability to define what the appropriate AWP for a par-
ticular drug was.145 At the time, Medicare seemed hamstrung by the “wrath 
of the oncology lobby,” leading it to “turn[] a blind eye to the AWP loop-
hole.”146 The result, of course, was years of overpayments for Medicare’s 
Part B drugs. 
The move to the average sales price (“ASP”), which was ushered in by 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003,147 featured the adoption of “a far more accurate assessment of the 
drug’s average market price than the company-reported AWP.”148 Addition-
ally, studies during the middle of the previous decade proved this point; as 
part of an effort to align state Medicaid programs’ reimbursement mecha-
nism with the recently adopted ASP-based reimbursement regime in Medi-
care, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) analyzed differences between 
ASP and AWP in a 2006 report and illuminated fascinating data.149 
Examining pricing from the third quarter of 2004, the report found that 
replacing AWP with ASP marked a radical shift. ASP was found to be “sub-
stantially lower than average wholesale price”150 for the 2077 national drug 
codes that OIG reviewed.151 Specifically, the “median percentage difference 
between ASP and AWP [was] 49 percent.”152 For single source brand codes, 
ASP was found to be 26% below the AWP median, with multisource brand 
codes being 30% below the AWP median.153 Stunningly, for generics, the 
ASP was 68% less than AWP at the median.154 Further, “the differences be-
tween AWP and other prices analyzed [were found to be] similar for both 
Medicare and Medicaid drugs.”155 
Medicare shifted to the ASP-based regime, in which it reimbursed up-
on a figure “calculated by the manufacturer every calendar quarter and 
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submitted to CMS within 30 days of the close of the quarter.”156 The calcu-
lation is reached after CMS receives the reported prices for sales to every 
purchasers and “is based on actual transaction price data.”157 It “includes 
virtually all discounts and rebates,” and has been called “a near-actual net 
purchase price.”158 
Indeed, Medicare Part B’s reimbursement regime, the amount that 
Medicare reimburses doctors for drugs they administer in their offices, is 
undoubtedly more accurate than the old AWP days, but a familiar narrative 
continues to permeate the story. Under Medicare’s reimbursement mecha-
nism, the prices of drugs still may influence the physicians who prescribe 
and administer them. In some regards, it seems stunning that drugs that are 
more expensive carry a larger potential profit for the doctors who adminis-
ter them.159 
One example features the substantial price difference between Lucentis 
and Avastin for treatment of age-related macular degeneration (“AMD”).160 
A condition that affects millions of Americans, AMD is generally treated by 
these two drugs, both of which are manufactured by the same company.161 
Both provide nearly clinically-equivalent benefits, but with Lucentis priced 
at roughly $2000 per injection and Avastin at around $50 per injection, oph-
thalmologists have a powerful incentive to rely on the more expensive drug 
due to the “ASP plus six” reimbursement mechanism for Medicare Part 
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B.162 For each dose of Lucentis, they stand to profit around $120, and for 
Avastin, providers’ potential profit is $3.163 As a result, Medicare’s system 
provides an incentive to providers to rely on a more expensive drug.164 
The same is true for drugs that treat advanced cancer. In August of 
2012, the doctors at Sloan-Kettering, while determining whether or not to 
administer Zaltrap to their patients, stood to make a profit of six percent on 
the price of Zaltrap, which was introduced to the market at $11,000 per 
month.165 In effect, and in a bizarre reality, Medicare Part B is financially 
incentivizing doctors to choose the more expensive drugs. It is nothing short 
of stunning when providers, like those at Sloan-Kettering, or even fifty-six 
percent of ophthalmologists nationwide, reject the more expensive drugs.166 
C. The Relationship Between ASP and Utilization 
Even with Medicare Part B’s more accurate ASP-based reimbursement 
mechanism, Part B drug spending has continued to rise without pause; ac-
cording to CMS, Part B drug costs were estimated to be about $22 billion in 
2015, double what they were in 2007,167 and about $3 billion more than 
what they were in just 2013.168 Admittedly, whether and how one can be 
sure that the cost of a specific drug influences the doctors prescribing them, 
and, if so, to what extent, is a substantial challenge.169 
Nevertheless, recent studies have shown a relationship between an in-
crease in reimbursement and an increase in usage. In a 2015 report, the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission noted that “[t]he six percent add-
on to ASP may create incentive to use higher priced drugs.”170 Indeed, the 
Commission noted that the more expensive drug “has the potential to gen-
erate more profit,” but also observed that “few studies exist that examine 
whether the six percent add-on is influencing providers’ choice of drugs.”171 
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There have been, however, a handful of studies that seem to demon-
strate at least a modest, and some show a substantial, relationship between 
reimbursement add-ons and utilization, with a 2012 OIG study finding a 
serious change in physician prescribing behaviors.172 Indeed, following the 
removal of a least costly alternative and the instatement of the “ASP plus 
six percent” reimbursement structure for treatments for prostate cancer, this 
2012 study found that “utilization patterns shifted dramatically in favor of 
certain costlier products.”173 
Other studies have echoed these findings.174 A 2006 study reviewing 
chemotherapy drugs found that “[a]lthough reimbursement seems to have 
little effect on the primary decision to administer palliative chemotherapy to 
patients with advanced solid tumors, it appears to affect the choice of drugs 
used.”175 Overall, the study’s authors found that “physicians receiving 
more-generous Medicare reimbursements used more-costly treatment regi-
mens.”176 
Further, a 2010 study found that “precipitous drops in reimbursement for 
[two lung cancer drugs] were associated with a decline in a use of these 
agents,” and the authors “observed a shift to Docetaxel, the most expensive 
agent, which provided the largest profit in absolute terms thanks to the fixed 
six percent margin paid above the ASP.”177 Nevertheless, the authors noted 
that straight fee cuts may lead physicians to do more to make up for the lost 
profit, and noted that “fee cuts cannot reliably or predictably control spend-
ing.”178 The studies seemed to show a relationship between the cost of the 
drug and potential profit amount for the physician with the usage of the drug. 
D. The Abandoned 2016 CMS Proposal 
In the spring of 2016, CMS put forth a new proposal that envisioned 
revamping Medicare’s Part B reimbursement mechanism.179 The proposal, 
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which sought to “improv[e] incentives” under Medicare Part B,180 suggest-
ed changing the “ASP plus six” formula, and specifically suggested testing 
“whether changing the add-on payment to 2.5 percent plus a flat fee pay-
ment of $16.80 per drug per day change[d] prescribing incentives and [led] 
to improved quality and value.”181 Of course, this would have substantially 
increased the reimbursement for doctors who use inexpensive drugs, and 
would have substantially decreased reimbursement for physicians who ad-
minister expensive ones.182 The proposal also suggested employing addi-
tional “value-based purchasing tools,” including testing reference pricing 
and indications-based pricing.183 
Indeed, the proposal would have had an effect on the “add-on” (physi-
cian profit) for a drug like Zaltrap.184 Using the 2012 original price of Zal-
trap as an example (roughly $11,000 per month), under the old formula, 
physicians would stand to be reimbursed $11,660 per month under an “ASP 
plus six” formula, which is an “add-on” totaling $660.185 Under the new 
formula, that doctor would be reimbursed $11,291.80 per month, an “add-
on” total of $291.80.186 Medicare Part B would have saved $368.20 per pa-
tient per month on a drug that costs as much as Zaltrap did in 2012.187 
The proposal would have changed the calculus for ophthalmologists 
treating AMD as well.188 Using the Lucentis and Avastin example men-
tioned above, the new proposal would have changed the profit “add-on” a 
physician makes from administering Lucentis from $120 to $66.80, and 
would have changed the profit “add-on” that physician would pocket for 
administering Avastin from about $3 to $18.05.189 Although it would not 
have completely eliminated potential financial incentives that the physician 
would face, it would have sought to balance them more evenly.190 
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Reaction to the proposal that suggested revamping the reimbursement 
scheme for prescription drugs reimbursed under Medicare Part B was as 
swift as it was loud.191 Within nine days of the new proposal, more than 
three hundred health care organizations wrote to U.S. Senators Mitch 
McConnell and Harry Reid, House Speaker Paul Ryan, and House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi to criticize it.192 In the letter, the organizations noted 
that the proposed new payment model would “adversely affect the care and 
treatment of Medicare patients,” and requested the recipients “ask CMS to 
withdraw the proposed rule.”193 
Arguing that the change was “misguided” and that it could “lead to an 
abrupt halt in [Medicare beneficiaries’] treatment,” the letter specifically 
targeted CMS’s suggestions regarding restructuring the ASP formula.194 It 
condemned the proposal for “fail[ing] to take into account the fact that pro-
viders’ prescribing decisions depend on a variety of factors,” and argued a 
lack of “evidence indicating that the payment changes contemplated by the 
model will improve the quality of care.”195 Calling it a “severe reimburse-
ment cut,” and that the drugs covered by Medicare Part B—the target of the 
proposal—“account for just 3% of total program costs,”196 the letter fol-
lowed a separate communication sent to HHS Secretary Burwell two weeks 
before, which largely made the same argument and request.197 
The New York Times noted that the proposal—“the administration’s 
first serious attempt to rein in drug spending”—“touched off a tempest.”198 
Senator Orrin Hatch and Representatives Fred Upton and Kevin Brady re-
leased a statement, warning that the proposal may “limit access to care” and 
that it was “another troubling example of unelected bureaucrats making de-
cisions behind closed doors.”199 In this statement that both seems to prove 
that changing the financial incentives for physicians will impact patient care 
and illustrates a shorthanded knowledge of the varying standards of care 
throughout the country, the Congressmen expressed concern that the pro-
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posed model may have resulted in Medicare beneficiaries receiving differ-
ent levels and standards of care based on their geographic area due to the 
pilot’s suggestion that different parts of the country experience the new re-
imbursement mechanism before others.200 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) 
argued that the existing Medicare Part B drug payment scheme was “effec-
tive” and that the new proposal put “Medicare patients who rely on these 
medicines at risk.”201 The American Society of Clinical Oncology called the 
proposal “heavy-handed,” noting that it was “inappropriate for CMS to ma-
nipulate choice of treatment for cancer patients.”202 The American College 
of Rheumatology argued that the new proposal threatened the viability of 
small and rural providers, and noted that it had been met with a “huge back-
lash” by providers.203 
For other entities, it was welcome news: AARP and the Center for 
American Progress supported the proposal.204 The Obama administration’s 
new policy proposal also signaled what could have been a larger regulatory 
shift in policing America’s ever-growing health care budget, demonstrating 
the continuation of the Obama’s administration’s more aggressive policy 
path than those used by previous administrations.205 
It is true that the proposal in question, which featured a plan to test the 
different prescription drug reimbursement model through Medicare’s drug 
reimbursement policy, was both groundbreaking and non-permanent.206 It 
was a proposal that could have changed,207 but could have also shifted Med-
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icare’s reimbursement scheme for prescription drugs paid for by Medicare 
Part B quite substantially for decades to come.208 It also is the case that the 
proposal had differential effects on Medicare providers, depending on spe-
cialty and practice. Specifically, the proposal may have “deliver[ed] a blow to 
those in a handful of specialties, particularly oncologists, ophthalmologists, 
and rheumatologists, who earn[ed] substantial shares of their revenue from 
Medicare’s longstanding method of paying them a drug’s average sales price 
. . . plus six percent,”209 but it may have benefitted primary care physicians 
in family practice.210  
Nonetheless, the negative reaction was too much. Early on, CMS Dep-
uty Administrator for Innovation and Quality and Chief Medical Officer 
Patrick Conway and HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell became the targets of 
an online change.org petition authored by the Coalition of State Rheumatol-
ogy Organizations.211 After weeks of “feeling the heat,” Conway noted that 
CMS was open to making changes to the proposal, and, by December of 
2016, following the presidential election of Donald Trump, CMS aban-
doned the Part B proposal.212 
III. FINANCIAL TOXICITY 
Aside from government reimbursement policy, new work on financial 
toxicity may provide a foothold for meaningful self-regulation among pro-
                                                                                                                 
the new proposal “doesn’t hit [the] point” that financial considerations are removed from “the 
prescribing of medicine,” then the agency would be open to adjusting the proposal) (alteration in 
original). 
 208 See Pear, supra note 198. 
 209 Dickson, supra note 200.  
 210 Id. 
 211 Coalition of State Rheumatology Organizations, Preserve Access to Important Rheumatology 
Medicines in Medicare, CHANGE.ORG (Mar. 2016), https://www.change.org/p/urgent-preserve-
access-to-important-rheumatology-medicines-in-medicare [https://perma.cc/8XX8-DEQE]. Dr. Conway 
noted that 
I was named in a Change.org petition where I got email about every 20 seconds from 
patients saying their doctor said they wouldn’t get their medicine . . . . [I]t bothered me 
personally; it was clear that was not what this proposal is intended to do. It was disap-
pointing they were hearing that from people in the healthcare system. 
Frieden, supra note 207. 
 212 See Virgil Dickson, CMS Feels the Heat to Change Medicare Part B Drug Pay Plan, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 4, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160504/NEWS/
160509979 [https://perma.cc/PBZ3-MHUT] (“Dr. Patrick Conway . . . said the agency is open to 
making changes, especially ensuring rural providers aren’t negatively affected and slowing down the 
timeline for implementing changes”); Virgil Dickson, Mandatory Participation Killed the Part B 
Demo, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161216/
NEWS/161219925 [https://perma.cc/N9JR-6FQC]. 
2017] Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard of Care 135 
viders in an industry that must seek to control health care costs.213 Currently 
recognized within long-term cancer treatment, the phenomenon of financial 
toxicity likely also exists in other health care contexts, and its policy effects 
could be wide-ranging. 
Roughly defined as “financial difficulties that stem from dealing with 
cancer [that] can lead people to avoid or delay care or drugs . . . and [that] 
may also cause stress that can lead to mental and physical health problems,” 
financial toxicity is drawing increasing attention in health policy circles.214 
As policymakers and providers learn more about the effects of this new 
threat in cancer treatment—and as, perhaps, the concern about financial tox-
icity expands into other corners of American health care largely impacted 
by cost—the focus may provide the long-awaited impetus for slowing, or 
even reversing, rising prescription drug costs. What exactly financial toxici-
ty is, followed by what it could mean for policy and legal development in 
this area, again, a big driver of excess cost in American health care, follows 
immediately below. 
Section A describes financial toxicity as observed in long-term cancer 
patients.215 Section B discusses the potential legal and policy effects of fi-
nancial toxicity.216 Section C examines the potential legal and policy im-
pacts of a linkage between expensive care and poor care.217 
A. As a Phenomenon 
Perhaps a term as dramatic as it is relevant, financial toxicity addresses 
the long-ignored effect of the cost of very expensive health care—or specifi-
cally, pharmaceutical drugs used to treat life-threatening cancer—on the actu-
al health, and mortality rate, of the patients undergoing the treatment or taking 
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the medicine.218 Similar to other side effects, “financial toxicity has been 
linked to differences in health-related quality of life, compliance, and, most 
recently, survival.”219 Recent studies have shown a clear, undeniable connec-
tion between patient financial strain and reduced chances of survival.220 Im-
portant for the purposes here, financial toxicity can include multiple negative 
effects on patients due to the cost of prescription drugs. Indeed, one of these 
potential negative effects is that “higher co-pays deter patients from filling 
their prescriptions,” which has been demonstrated by patient study.221 
Perhaps more interestingly, as one commenter noted, “cancer’s burden 
isn’t just high drug costs.”222 Although a threat of patients skipping out on 
filling prescriptions due to cost is a problem (mentioned below as “cost-
related nonadherence”), recent studies have demonstrated something more 
profound: that financial stress and personal bankruptcy, particularly due to, 
or at least precipitated by, health care costs, leads to worse health outcomes, 
at least for cancer patients.223 Excessive cost, particularly costs borne by 
patients who are asked to pay for drugs whose prices are in the thousands of 
dollars per month, could actually threaten the health of the patient.224 
In one such study that was published in early 2016, the authors com-
pared bankruptcy filing records and cancer registry records in western 
Washington over fifteen years in an effort “to examine the relationship be-
tween bankruptcy filing and survival” for individuals with cancer.225 Noting 
that “clinicians are ill prepared to advise patients because they typically 
have little knowledge of their patients’ health insurance or general financial 
circumstances,” the study compared those with cancer who file for bank-
ruptcy with those with cancer who do not.226 In a result likely to start a con-
versation around whether or not economic hardship and poor health out-
comes are related, the authors concluded that “[s]evere financial distress 
requiring bankruptcy protection after cancer diagnosis appears to be a risk 
factor for mortality.”227 
Fascinatingly, the authors found that “[m]ortality rates among patients 
with breast, lung, colorectal, or prostate cancer who filed for bankruptcy 
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were significantly higher than for patients with those cancers who did not 
file for bankruptcy.”228 Further, “[t]he risk of mortality was almost twice as 
high among patients with prostate cancer who filed for bankruptcy com-
pared with those who did not, and it was 2.5 times as high among patients 
with colorectal cancer who filed compared with those who did not.”229 
Importantly, the authors completed a propensity score matching pro-
cess, and focused on patients who received similar initial treatments after 
diagnosis.230 The “adjusted hazard ratio” for mortality for those who filed 
for bankruptcy compared against those who did not was 1.79.231 In order to 
ensure their comparison was true, the authors “limited to patients diagnosed 
when the disease was in early stage and who declared bankruptcy within 
one year of diagnosis so that they would still likely have been in early stage 
at the time of filing.”232 The study’s authors “found a consistent, positive 
association between filing for bankruptcy and earlier mortality, suggesting 
that those who reach the point of financial insolvency after a cancer diagno-
sis have significantly poorer outcomes than those who do not.”233 Notably, 
“the impacts of financial insolvency on mortality observed for [the] study 
[were] similar to or exceed[ed] observed socioeconomic disparities in sur-
vival outcomes.”234 Finally, the authors noted that: 
Because financial distress appears to have a significant negative 
impact on health outcomes, we believe that cancer care facilities 
and oncology practitioners may need to consider the financial 
health of their patients as a matter of course simultaneously with 
the initiation of therapy . . . . Our results underscore the importance 
of considering the recommendation for and use of services that 
have limited evidence of substantial benefit and potential high out-
of-pocket costs.235 
Indeed, those with insurance are surely not immune from the threat 
posed by financial toxicity. A separate study in March 2016 noted that twen-
ty-nine percent of Medicare’s cancer survivors “reported financial burden of 
some kind, ranging from bankruptcy to borrowing money to not being able 
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to pay for medical visits.”236 Of these individuals, eighty-six percent carried 
health insurance while being treated.237 
The authors of this study found that individuals reporting a financial 
burden had lower Physical Component Scores (“PCS”) and Mental Compo-
nent Scores (“MCS”) in a Short-Form Health Survey.238 Finding that “sur-
vivors reporting [more than] three financial problems reported statistically 
significant and clinically meaningful differences . . . in the mean PCS and 
MCS compared with survivors without financial problems,”239 Kale and 
Carroll concluded that “[c]ancer-related financial burden was associated 
with lower health-related quality of life, increased risk of depressed mood, 
and a higher frequency of worrying about cancer recurrence.”240 
Specifically, according to Kale, the survivors with “three or more fi-
nancial problems had clinically meaningful differences in their physical and 
mental health-related quality of life and were two to three times more likely 
to report depressed mood and six to eight times more likely to worry about 
cancer recurrence.”241 The survivors most likely to face financial struggles 
“were younger at diagnosis, female, a member of a racial or ethnic minority, 
and who had short-survival cancers.”242 Crucially, “[a]s financial problems 
increased, health-related quality of life decreased.”243 
Finally, “recent research suggesting a link between financial toxicity 
and greater risk of mortality is compelling.”244 One scholar noted that fi-
nancial toxicity may lead to increased likelihood of mortality due to three 
main causes: “(1) poorer subjective well-being, (2) impaired health-related 
quality of life, and (3) sub-par quality of care.”245 Subjective well-being is 
characterized by “different valuations that people make regarding their 
lives, the events happening to them, their bodies and minds, and the circum-
stances in which they live,” and may “impact health outcomes including 
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survival.”246 Health-related quality of life includes “aspects of quality of life 
that relate specifically to a person’s health, including domains of physical, 
social, and mental functioning.”247 Patients with financial hardship are 
“more likely to report poor physical health, poor mental health, and less 
satisfaction with relationships.”248 Indeed, poor health-related quality of life 
“is an independent negative prognostic marker for cancer patients.”249 
Third, financial strain can impact quality of care, implicating cost-related 
nonadherence to prescription drugs,250 a “significant contributor to avoida-
ble health care costs in this country.”251 
How providers conceive of financial toxicity informs how they think it 
should best be addressed. One has advocated for increased disclosure and 
provider-patient discussion regarding the effects of the costs of drugs so that 
the doctor can “adjust the treatment if a patient wants.”252 A doctor could 
choose cheaper drugs for her patients,253 help the patient seek financial as-
sistance,254 or seek insurance pre-approval for pharmaceutical drugs “before 
sending the patient to the pharmacy.”255 Others have called for physicians to 
“focus more on shared decision-making with patients to the extent that’s 
possible, and spend more time than . . . has been spent in the past to see if 
you can find equally effective, lower cost treatment.”256 If possible, they 
argue, perhaps patients should also seek out financial planning assistance.257 
The connection between financial toxicity and mortality serves as a 
profound development in the struggle for cost-effective, high-quality patient 
care. On some level, however, these studies’ findings do not seem surpris-
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ing; as individuals struggle with financial burdens, it would seem natural 
that their physical health and recoveries may be affected. Nevertheless, the 
extent to which these individuals are affected, and, for the instant focus, the 
potential impact of financial toxicity on law, quality regulation, health poli-
cy, and the nagging problem of overtreatment and excess cost cannot be 
underestimated. This viewpoint that financial toxicity could serve as a po-
tential legal breakthrough and, at least, a potent policy tool, follows below. 
B. As a Legal Breakthrough 
Should the understanding of financial toxicity expand beyond cancer 
care, its teaching could transform the American health care enterprise. After 
decades of legal and regulatory challenges in this area, an understanding of 
financial toxicity could radically alter health care delivery. Specifically, if 
one can show that increased cost leads to worse health outcomes, and that 
the cost of a procedure or prescription drug can be viewed as providers 
view other potential bad side effects, then the legal and policy-based treat-
ment of the cost issue changes. Once the quality of the care being delivered 
by the provider is implicated, ethical and legal duties spring forth to protect 
the patient in her moment of extreme vulnerability.258 Most bluntly, once 
cost becomes a component factor of quality, as prohibitively expensive 
health care actually threatens the health of the patient, then the provider is 
required to begin caring about cost. 
Although changing, this is not the current dominant paradigm in Amer-
ican health care. Instead, providers and hospitals too often separate the 
“quality” question from the “cost” question. Within American health care 
today, providers seem to treat the cost of care as an issue of secondary im-
portance, and, frequently, policymakers and patients are reminded that the 
physician’s focus must be solely on the health of the patient. It is this para-
digm that leads to the thinking that, if a drug like Zaltrap costs more than 
$10,000 per month, but is likely to extend a patient’s life, then the drug 
should be administered.259 Indeed, it may be one of the chief reasons why 
drug companies feel emboldened to charge ever-increasing amounts for life-
sustaining or life-saving drugs. 
Granted, this separation—cost from quality—may have been initially 
well intentioned. The separation was built to protect the patient against a pro-
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vider, hospital, insurance company, or even government-funded Medicare 
program, bent on limiting cost, from limiting potential treatment options 
available to the patient.260 Indeed, due to its seeming queasiness about any-
thing that could be viewed as state-sanctioned health care rationing, Congress 
has even prevented Medicare from imposing a publicly-considered cost-
effectiveness requirement for its coverage determinations.261 As a result, the 
American health care system has operated on a nearly cost-blind manner, 
with too few actors in the enterprise focused on the overall cost of the care 
that is being delivered. This is particularly true within the Medicare program. 
There are at least two major problems with the dominant paradigm. 
The first, at least based upon the nascent research focused on financial tox-
icity, is that policymakers cannot separate a patient’s financial health, in-
cluding harm experienced as a result of being administered expensive health 
care, from her physical health and quality of life. This early research shows 
that the two influence one another. In effect, it seems, a provider cannot de-
liver high-quality care until that provider understands all of the potential 
negative impacts that the treatment may cause the patient. To completely 
separate “cost” from “quality” seems not only unhelpful, but harmful to the 
actual quality of care that is being delivered by the provider. 
Second, this construction—that cost and quality must be separate—
also assumes a belief that is no longer accurate. Specifically, this belief as-
sumes that patients need protection from payers and providers who are bent 
on not spending enough on or rationing their care. By separating cost and 
quality, the system can be confident that it is free from ulterior motives fo-
cused on limitations, and the purity of the health care enterprise—focused 
solely on patient care—remains intact. Nevertheless, at least in Medicare 
Part B prescription drug reimbursement, and perhaps in other areas of the 
federal health care enterprise, this belief seems to be either inapplicable or 
incorrect. 
To an observer of the American health care endeavor, it is clear that 
providers, hospitals, and particularly, pharmaceutical companies, have very 
few incentives to limit cost. Granted, the ACA has sought to change some 
of the twisted incentives that characterized the Medicare program since its 
inception, and has sought to realign hospital reimbursement to push these 
centers of care to focus on quality and not just volume.262 Without any rate 
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regulation263 or other serious cost control on the enterprise—and, dependent 
on a Medicare program that lacks a history of cost effectiveness or efficien-
cy, particularly within Part B reimbursement—it seems as though it may be 
time to allow cost to be a part of the quality conversation. 
The studies on financial toxicity provide the opening. Indeed, they 
seem to suggest that, at least for patients who are likely to suffer financial 
burdens as a result of prescription drug costs, administering an expensive 
drug may not reflect high-quality care. From a legal perspective, forcing the 
health care enterprise to ignore, or at least not adequately consider, the fi-
nancial effect of the prescription drug on the health of the patient seems 
short-sided at best, and counterproductive at worst. 
Although this suggestion may seem intuitive, this recognition would con-
stitute a notable change within health law and policy. Indeed, once one can 
make the argument that, at least for patients who are likely to suffer financial 
burdens as a result of prescription drug costs, prescribing the most expensive 
drugs for those patients may be a lower quality option—particularly because 
of the health effects they may suffer—then the legal, regulatory, and ethical 
spheres orbiting the provider that govern patient-provider relationship all shift. 
C. Finally Linking Cost, Quality, and Harm 
The challenge facing American regulators and prosecutors seeking to 
limit cost growth within the health care enterprise has been complicated by 
diffuse and disparate legal regimes. For instance, within American health 
care, patients rely upon state-based medical malpractice doctrines to ensure 
providers administer health care of a sufficient quality.264 State medical li-
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censing boards also have the ability to punish providers who fail to meet 
certain standards.265 For doctors who commit fraud and abuse, America re-
lies upon federal prosecutors at the DOJ to intervene and prosecute. Also, 
government health care programs like Medicare have the ability to exclude 
providers, but have never been particularly successful at denying claims in 
real time.266 Nevertheless, the cost problems facing American health care 
have their roots in an area within the health care enterprise where none of 
these legal and regulatory regimes have sufficient reach. The root of Ameri-
ca’s overtreatment problem seems to be the result of a lack of sufficient ac-
tion—insufficient incentives, an absence of cost-effectiveness requirements, 
and no price negotiations, to name a few. 
Linking the cost challenge to the concern over quality may transform 
the regulation of overtreatment, however. Indeed, excessive cost and utiliza-
tion problems have not typically been seen as a quality problem; patients 
who may receive excessive health care do not typically rely on medical 
malpractice lawsuits to sue doctors who allegedly overtreat, nor do state 
medical licensing boards typically punish providers who aggressively over-
treat their patients. Typically, both of those regimes are focused on quality 
problems—deficient technique, patient harm, and high error rates. 
Second, Medicare lacks the resources to adequately address the prob-
lem with its regulatory tools. The program performs a delicate dance be-
tween increasing staffing for adequate oversight and not overstepping the 
blurry but ever-present line of “too much” government involvement in 
American health care. Additionally, federal prosecutors are well-equipped 
to pursue cases against doctors and hospitals that overtreat their patients as 
part of fraudulent schemes, but, without evidence of fraudulent intent, these 
tools are inapplicable as well. Overtreatment, the result of a lack of precise 
and calibrated regulation, cannot adequately be prevented by fraud actions 
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that implicate the blunt, draconian, and ever-strengthening267 federal False 
Claims Act (“FCA”).268 
Therefore, if one can make the argument that, contrary to current legal 
application, when a patient is administered an expensive procedure, or a 
highly-priced pharmaceutical drug, that patient could face legally compen-
sable harm, the beginnings of a powerful new legal paradigm take shape. 
For instance, if one is a Medicare beneficiary at high risk of financial duress 
following a very expensive prescription drug, and nonetheless, her provider 
prescribes the drug, causing her to suffer personal bankruptcy concomitant 
with a decline in her quality of life—and perhaps, the loss of her life—it 
would seem that the care she was provided did not meet the appropriate 
standard of care. She would definitely have evidence of clear harm. 
The advantages of inculcating cost within the ethic of care cannot be 
underestimated. First, doing so would clearly erect a cost-effectiveness hur-
dle within the mind of the physician—i.e., pushing the provider to consider 
whether a given drug, given its cost, would be worthwhile for a particular 
patient. Second, it would finally appoint a gatekeeper, the physician, be-
tween the pharmaceutical company and the patient. A gatekeeper, well 
versed on the particular advantages of a drug, but also well aware of his 
patient’s needs, could be an effective advocate for cost-effectiveness. In 
effect, the law’s recognition of the gatekeeping function would simply be 
instantiating what some hospitals and doctors nationwide already do.269 It 
would also jettison Congress’s effort to regulate pricing within the health 
care and pharmaceutical industry, which, given decades of evidence, either 
lacks political will or simply does not work.270 
Finally, should physicians be explicitly concerned about the financial 
toxicity threat posed to their patients—indeed, if her patient suffers finan-
cial toxicity as a result of care and then is empowered to sue her for a 
breach of the standard of care—then these cost-effective clinical decisions 
will be made by the physician, as opposed to a government or other third-
party. For example, if Medicare tells the doctors at Sloan-Kettering that they 
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are no longer allowed to rely on Zaltrap, or should greatly curtail it because 
of its cost, one can imagine the lack of perceived legitimacy of such a de-
termination, given the identity of the party making that determination. In-
deed, from the perspective of the sick patient, it would appear as though the 
government is minimizing the expertise of the provider in an effort to cut 
costs and ration care. 
If, however, it is the provider who, after considering the cost of the 
drug and the needs of her patients, makes the determination that Zaltrap is 
too expensive for her patients, then this clinical decision is different. In ef-
fect, by instantiating the concern of excess prescription drug cost into the 
standard of care, the Medicare program would be gaining a key gatekeeper 
who would be focused on cost-effectiveness without any of the negative 
costs that come with government fiat. Also, the patient would be gaining a 
key ally who is concerned not just with her cancer, but also with her health. 
As a result, the potential linkage between expensive care and poor care 
could be legally transformative. At the very least, it would apply pressure on 
providers to be cognizant of potential financial impacts on their patients, per-
haps pushing more providers to seek to emulate the doctors at Sloan-
Kettering. If more doctors act like those did at Sloan-Kettering, maybe more 
prescription drug companies will reduce prices in response, like Sanofi did. 
IV. CRUMBLING ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 
The recognition of the potential impact of financial toxicity on the us-
age, advisability, and cost of prescription drugs comes at a time when a 
number of the “hard law” tools of litigation and strict regulation—including 
both legal regimes of Medicare fraud and marketing fraud, two of the prem-
ier modern cost control tools within the health law industry—appear to be 
under assault.271 Specifically, a primary way to prevent and punish over-
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educate physicians on the off-label features, benefits and uses of the company’s devices”); see 
also Tom Korosec & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Abbott Wins in $1 Billion Trial Over Marketing of 
Stents, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-07/abbott-
defeats-1-billion-lawsuit-over-stent-marketing [https://perma.cc/RG2X-UDJQ] (including an 
allegation that “Abbott . . . [sent] letters on behalf of doctors to potential patients and teaching 
hospitals and physicians how to code bills to get Medicare reimbursements” and that the whistle-
blower sold “almost exclusively to physicians who would use them for vascular procedures” (the 
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treatment caused by the overuse of expensive pharmaceutical drugs, the 
regulatory regimes of (1) food and drug marketing-based off-label regula-
tion and (2) fraud regulation for off-label marketing, have run into formida-
ble court-made challenges.272 Additionally, medical necessity-based fraud, a 
potential legal pathway to liability for pharmaceutical companies that alleg-
edly engaged in false marketing, and a powerful tool that could be used to 
rein in uses of expensive pharmaceutical drugs that may lack cost effective-
ness, has also been weakened as a potential pathway to liability.273 
As a result, it is reasonable to believe that whistleblowers and pharma-
ceutical companies may need to alter their proof calculations for proceeding 
to trial in these cases. With the state of law in such flux, a solution focused 
on inculcating cost effectiveness goals within the clinical conception of 
medical quality and medical standards may be more efficient than more in-
vestigations, prosecutions, and lawsuits. Pushing doctors themselves into 
incorporating and embedding these cost effectiveness concerns seems to be 
the best, or only, complete solution to America’s cost and utilization prob-
lem as it relates to prescription drugs. 
 Section A introduces the framework of new governance to situate the 
effects of financial toxicity within a larger legal framework.274 Section B 
then argues that physicians are uniquely suited to effectuate cost savings.275 
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 272 Krause, supra note 271, at 404–12. 
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(D.N.J. 2015) (rejecting the allegation that “misrepresentations of the effectiveness of Plavix pre-
vented physicians from making this determination accurately, and that those misrepresentations 
caused physicians to falsely conclude that Plavix was a medically necessary drug eligible for Med-
icaid coverage” because medical necessity in a majority of states does not imply a cost-
effectiveness requirement). 
 274 See infra notes 276–292 and accompanying text. 
 275 See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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A. Financial Toxicity and New Governance 
Although scholars have disagreed on the best way forward to regulate 
the cost of prescription drugs,276 there are new doctrinal tools that seem to 
suggest a continued move away from hard law tools and toward collaborative 
solutions throughout the law. Recently, the theory of new governance, a new 
doctrinal pathway that seeks more effective regulation, has garnered in-
creased scholarly attention.277 New governance principles occupy an im-
portant middle ground between the historically dominant paradigms of com-
mand-and-control and market-based solutions within administrative law: 
Traditional command-and-control regulation has long been the sub-
ject of scholarly critique for its inefficiencies and frequent failures. 
At the same time, widespread inadequacies of market self-ordering 
are also well-documented. Given the continuing need for govern-
ment intervention along with the limits of traditional command-
and-control regulation and the growing pressures to liberalize mar-
kets, regulators around the world are developing innovative third-
way approaches to regulation, collectively referred to as the new 
governance model.278 
New governance provides a doctrinal underpinning of the practical shift 
advocated here, and supports the notion that old hard law solutions can 
achieve only a limited amount of regulatory success when attempting to 
control prescription drug costs. Applying this new doctrine to health law 
reform has been done before,279 but considering its impact on the price of 
prescription drugs also seems worthwhile. 
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 278 Id. at 68–69. 
 279 See Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. 
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Particularly, the theory of new governance focuses on public/private 
collaboration, decentralization, soft law solutions, adaptability, and coordi-
nation, among other tenets.280 It purports to be “flexible, revisable, experi-
mental, and/or participatory than traditional legal remedies.”281 Among its 
buzzwords include “cooperative compliance,”282 “collective endeavor,”283 
and “shared problem-solving process.”284 Further, new governance has been 
hailed for its ability to “blur regulatory lines.”285 
Importantly, this includes an increased role for regulated parties. In a 
new governance regime, the “regulated parties are involved themselves in 
setting the standards,” as the rule-making authority is decentralized.286 Ad-
ditionally, these standards and norms are subject to constant change and 
improvement following near-constant peer review and benchmarking.287 
Finally, because of the constant feedback and collaborative solutions, “new 
governance blurs the boundaries” not only “between law and enforcement,” 
but also between “policy and implementation.”288 Collaboration means that 
the regime is seeking to achieve “continuous improvement.”289 
New governance is a reaction to failures of the hard law tools in ad-
ministrative regulation. As Lobel notes, 
Since the 1960s, top-down rules and adversarial enforcement—the 
hallmark of command-and-control—have often failed to achieve 
their intended goals of increasing compliance and, at times, have 
been counterproductive in regulating private industry . . . . Often, 
regulatory rules are too complex, markedly vague, needlessly de-
tailed, or simply unsuited to fit the realities of the new economy.290 
Indeed, beyond health law, command-and-control regulation seems to have 
been under attack in other administrative law disciplines as well.291 
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Important for the purposes here, new governance outsources the work 
of regulation to the regulated party. It relies upon private norms and rules, 
and “asks the regulated private companies to identify problems and risks 
and to continuously reflect on possible solutions—effectively, to self-
regulate.”292 In this way, it seems to fit quite nicely with the policy-based 
impact that may face American medicine following increased understanding 
of the dramatic effects of financial toxicity. 
B. Role for Physicians 
Using the action of the Sloan-Kettering physicians, a new understand-
ing of financial toxicity, and the doctrinal teaching of new governance, this 
Article contemplates a reconstruction of the health law regulatory structure 
and a shift in the physician’s standard of care. Indeed, hard law government 
tools (of which Congress is not likely to provide) and market-based solu-
tions have both failed to rein in prescription drug spending. Furthermore, 
relying on hard law tools, featuring the FCA and marketing fraud statutes to 
limit increases in spending appears to be a challenging task. 
Using the Sloan-Kettering example as a guide, the party in the best po-
sition to effect real change is the prescribing physician.293 Indeed, with in-
adequate pressure on the pharmaceutical company, and no rate regulation 
solution in sight, the best path forward appears to be acting on this decision 
making of the physician. By linking the cost of the drug to the quality of 
health care that the provider is administering, Medicare would have a pow-
erful tool that can be used to ensure that cost is finally considered during the 
provision of care. Doctors already naturally care about their patients’ well-
being; including the patient’s financial wellbeing in that sanctified space 
makes sense, particularly where one’s financial health can so drastically 
impact one’s physical health, and, indeed, the quality of care one receives. 
Further, this move would again empower the medical profession, relying 
upon the physician’s norms and ethics to make cost-constraining decisions 
without sacrificing quality. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pharmaceutical drug costs are rising rapidly, and America, particularly 
Medicare, has heretofore been unable to find the answer to the deepening 
crisis. Even well-publicized cases in which pharmaceutical companies seem 
to brazenly raise the price of their drugs have not been enough to move 
Congress to act. The DOJ’s use of anti-fraud statutes has been strained and 
stretched, and CMS’s proposed new reimbursement mechanism generated 
so much negative attention, one wonders if it can be successfully imple-
mented. Hard law tactics in this area do not seem promising. 
At the same time, researchers are increasingly understanding that a pa-
tient’s financial health following the provision of care greatly impacts that 
patient’s physical health. As a result, doctors that provide expensive care to 
patients may actually be providing poor care. Nowhere does this seem to 
matter more than in Medicare, with America’s elderly facing coinsurance 
rates that no longer insulate them from feeling the sharp pain of rising 
pharmaceutical drug costs. 
Therefore, following the example of the doctors at Sloan-Kettering, 
doctors should have a unique and powerful gatekeeping role in the health 
care enterprise. Indeed, price matters, and as policy makers begin to under-
stand that costs impact health, American medicine must shift to incorporate 
patient cost concerns into the standard of care. Such a shift gives providers 
important leverage against, and a backstop to, the harmful prices of phar-
maceutical drugs. 
